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I. INTRODUCTION
The two quotes above suggest alternate ideas about the sources of happiness. The first (written around AD 180) is nn Aristotelian notion. Happiness is a way of living, not a state. The second quote (written some 1500 years later) suggests ideas about the sources of happiness perhaps more akin to the way that we tend to view [hem today. Happiness is about conviviality, warmth. food (and perhaps some ale). Neither view: however. emphasizes the importance of wealth beyond the dreams of Croesus or Bill Gates. Further. that happiness and pleasure have been a subject of discussion since at least the earliest western philosophy cuggests high levels of national income are not necessary for happiness.
Nonetheless. ic is posited in ~nuch of the literature on economic grow~h [hat ever greater income lends to ever greater utility. If an economy expands, the goods produced in the now larger economy will satisfy conditions on a' higher indifference curve than the goods produced bel'ore. The assumption that consumers derive higher utility from being on a higher indifference curve is a fundamental of economics, and has been a commonplace across Lhe theoretical spectrum for a long time. Smith predates the terminology used above. but for him.
'the happiness of mankind seems to have been Ihe original purpose intenclell by the Author of nature' (Smith 1982, p. 166) .
and this happiness is furthered by the wealth of nations. More goods and more choices amongst those goods lead to greater utility, then. where utility is 'the pleasure or satisfaction derived hy an individuai from heing in a pa~r~culer situation or tinm consuming goods or services' (Bannock, Baxter and Davis 1987. p. 414) -a term for what one might label a particular form of happiness.
Borrowing from and building on work'by D u s e n b e q (1949), Mishan (1967) , Easterlin (1974) , Veenhoven (1 995) and Hudson (1996) (amongst others). I will argue that the marginal utility of absolute (as opposed to relative) income is much less significant than'sometimes assumed. especially in richer countries. To put it another way, there is rapidly declining utility gained in expanding the production possibility frontier. This can be explained by re-examining the causes of happiness in general. taking some 1esso;ls from a conception of happiness (at least in parts) held by Smith, Mill and Bentham. This conception also suggests that happiness might even be a cause rather than a symptom of economic growth. Using poll data from the OECD coun~ries over the last forty years. this paper argues that, if there is a link between growth and happinehs, it does indeed appear to run from happiness to growth. not viceversa. The paper concludes by noting some possible theoretical and policy consequences of this.
THEORY
Eve~yone recognizes that GNP per capita is far from a perfect linear measure of utility per capita or happiness per capita. First, there are c1e:irly goods and services captured in the national accounts -government o~~t p u t , for example -of which we do not know the value to consumers. Also. there are clearly zoods ~incl services trot captured in Lhe national ~iccounts -such :is housework -: L I I~ Lhings [hat people want (life expectancy or a clean. sale environment lor instance) l'or which GNP per capita is. at besr, an imperfect proxy. Compare Mozambirlue. China and the USA. In turn, the count~ies' GNPs per capita in 1997 were $80. $470 and $24.740. Infant mortalities were 145.6, 30.5 and 8.6 per 1.000 live births. respectively. Life expectancies were 47. 69 and 76 years. Thus, going 1.6 percent of the distance between Mozambique and the United States in terms of wealth, so reaching China's income. we move 84 percent of the distance in terms of infant mortality and 76 percent of the distance in terms of life expectancy.
In the case of negative externalities, such as pollution. the link between income and growth might even be negative (as Mishan i 967. p. 19, put it: 'bringing the Jerusalem of economic growth to England's green and pleasant land has so far conspicuously red~lced both the greenness and the pleasantness'). As the interdependence of our lives increases. so might the importance of these externalities (Abramovitz 1958, p. I I). To the extent that raising the income of all requires a process of social. political and cultural modernization, it may also be that many in society find this process more painful than the palliative effects of increased wealth (McMylor 1994) . The question of modernization links to a theoretical argument against a simple connection between growth and welfare. If growth changes values. altering indifference curves. it is impossible to say a priori if we will be happier before or after growth. As an example. there are certainly examples of our attitudes toward consumption changing as the economy has grown -Abramovitz mentions an increased tendency to base value on price and an increased emphasis on conformity to group taste ( I 958, p. 19) .
This links in with a question about the nature of utility, which has been a subject of some debate amongst economists as to its being a measure of satisfaction or of desiredness (Sen 1995, p. 13) . The rational, ~ltility-maximizing individual no doubt knows that which will satisfy him and so desire and satisfaction are interchangeable. There might be a real problem here, however. Indifference curves ' :IS revealed' are ~~ndoubtedly a measure ofdesil.edness, not satisfaction. This is, perhaps. a reason why ~noving ~l p indifference curves might not increase ~~tility. If the consumer is 1 1 0 1 a rational utility maximiser with perfect knowledge, he will not necessarily increase I~is utility because of jumping to a higher desire-based indifference curve -like King Midas. he might be suffering from a false self-knowledge of what will increase his satisfaction.
Further. given that choice itself is not cost-free. choice amongst plentiful but similar items might h~lve high costs in terms of production but low benefits in terms of consumption. Consumption also takes time -adding Inore goods if there is no time (o enjoy them might he fruilless (Linder 1970, p. 8) . As time rather than income becomes the binding constraint, it is likely that how we earn ;I living rather than what we earn will become ever Inore important to our satisiilction (Abl-:unovitz 1958) . A linked complaint ~lgairist GNP per capita is that I' or i t to he a measure of ; L country's ~tility gained from income, i( has LO be as-.sumed that. at the ~iiargin. an increment of income will be valued the same by a11 people. Within a country where there are disparities of income? this is imlikely to be true (the poor might well appreciate an extra dollar to spend more than the rich). Across countries, as it might be between Mozambique (with a GNP per capita of S80). and the US (with a GNP per capita of $23.740) such an assumption would be absurd (data from World Bank 1996)'. Finally. economists have long discussed the relative income hypothesis. that what matters to an individuai in a rich country might be his relative rlut his absolute wealth (Pigou 1812 , Dusenberry 1949 , Easterlin 1974 , Ng and Wang 1991 . In part this is because there are some things that require a high relative income to buy. Only the rich will ever be able to afford servants, for example (Hirsch 1978) . No amount of absolute income will land us all on the shores of Lake Woebegone.
Despite these problems, it has been widely accepted at least since Adam Smith that greater national wealth is for the greater national good. Although inequality is a complicating factor, Deininger and Squire (1996) note that it changes very slowly over time. The Kuznets hypothesis that growth could lead to greater inequality appears to be overblown. National growth. then. is likely to increase the income of all, at least to some extent. There is likely to be a diminishing marginal return to income. but it will almost certainly never be negative (even if the return to marginal income plus associated externalities might be). Thus, growth will in senera1 increase happiness overall, by providing more goods and greater choices amongst goods. Further, Pritchett and Summers (1996) have exhaustively confirmed the conventional wisdom that there is a positive causal relationship between income and health. Pigou (1912. p .1 I ) listed most of the broad arguments made above against a close relationship between happiness and growth and still concluded that 'it cannot he ~nalnlained seriously that an increase in (absolute income) will add i~otl~ir~g LL,/IULever to the salishctions which constitute economic welfare' This is a conclusion that most economists would probably still accept.
The idea that choice amongst plenty is one fundamental of happiness has a distinguished pedigree, then. However, many fathers of economic thought and welfare economics (a subject grounded in utilitarianism) had a view of utility which suggested limits to the extent to which income could create happiness. For example. even Adam Smith seemed to accept that there was a point at which more in-I. This is widelv accepted. People :Ippzar ro he luore comfortable accepling that an equal (Jerr,c.rrl-11,qe change in income will lead to equal increases in happiness. This seems ro be somewhat arhirrary as wcll. however. It still seems unlikely hat a I00 percent increase in the income of the Unired Stares would he an 'qua1 cause of Irappiness Lo .I d o l~b l i n~ of the averagz Incollie In Mora~nbiqur.
come I~as no use. He argued that large land-holdings were inefficient because the large landholder can have no real need or desire for more money (and so would not improve the land) (Smith 19 10. Book 11 Ch. 11). Mill implicitly denied the importance of income by arguing that libeq. is the surest way to the greatest good. If the most important freedom is that of men in relation to other men, the 'natural' boundaries of action are a relatively unimportant cause of a~nelio~able distress. Lack of techlology or of national weaith matter far less than iibeny from others, then. Both Smith and the Utilitarians did think that relative income was and would remain important. however. This was not only, or indeed primarily, because they supported the common modern arguments for the relative income hypothesis, or saw the poor as having a higher marginal utility of income because they had fewer consumer goods already. Relative income played a significant role in happiness because it would allow for the poor to be active in society. In On Libery, Mill argued that there was an important role for government intervention to protect the poor because no locality has the right 'to make itself by rnisrnanagement a nest of pauperism ... impairing the moral and physical condition of the whole laboring community' (Mill 1980, y. 140 ).
For the same reason, both Smith and Benthaln supported a minimum wage. one set relative to other incomes. that would allow the poor to preserve decency in society (Rothschild 1995, p. 336 and Stabile 1996. p. 689) .
The importance to happiness of preserving decency in society -and so allowing the poor to take an active role in society -was centered around the idea that happiness and virtuous activity were closely related. Both Smith and the majority of Utilitarians saw a significant link between moral behavior and happiness. For example. Mill argued that there are more and less valuable pleasures, and no intelligent. feeling man would be selfish or base -further. education should be used to ensure that men accepted the link between their own good and that of society (Stabile 1996. p. 690) . More recently, Bertrand Russell, writing on The Conquest ($ H~lyl~irzess ( 1930) noted that:
'I have written in lhis botik as 3 hedonist. lhat is to say, as one who regards happiness as the gocld. but the acts recommended liom the point of view of the hedonist are on the whole the same as those to be recornmended by the sane moralist'.
Despite holding to the yardstick of the greatest pleasure for the greatest number, then, Mill and other Utilitarians recognized the importance of ease in social interaction which came about in part through income equality, and Smith, at least, explicitly recognized there was a limit to the income that could create greater happiness. In fact, these thinker did not abandon an idea of the sources of pleasure that had a decidedly Aristotelian bent. While. Aristotle held e~itlaimorzia (doing well) rather than pleasure as the absolute good and saw individuals as no judge of their own happiness (Kenny 1992) : he too disapproved of excess (Aristotle 1980), saw pleasure and virtuous activity as inseperably bound up and saw a happy citizen as a inoral citizen (Aristotle 1962) . Thus. the link between doing well and feeling well has survived long. Most recently, of course. a variation has seen a revival amongst economists led by Amartya Sen (1980 Sen ( , 1985 Sen ( , 1992 , although Sen travels fiirther toward an Aristotelian definition than most Utilitarians would2. Indeed, there is now a large body of literature in economics that has attempted to model the effects of related concepts such as 'extended sympathy' on models of welfare economics (Dagum 1990) .
The links between virtue, social interaction and happiness are also found increasingly attractive by those who have made recent studies of happiness. 4 s Hudson (1996, p. 
107) puts it,
'the new sciznce o f happiness is slowly tracing its way hack to the past' For example, modern polls reveal that happy people view themselves as being Inore inoral lhan the average (Myers and Diener, p. 71) . Veenhoven (1993, pp. 69-70) has found evidence of a correlation between trust in one's fellow man and happiness (although. interestingly, there is a negative correlation between happiness and trust in institutions). Other studies of subjects ranked by self-proa interFessed happiness found that happier subjects have a high degree of soci I ' action and participation in the environment (McGill 1967; p. 333) . They are Inore likely to initiate social contact with friends. more likely to respond to requests for help, less likely to be absent ti-om work and less likely to be involved i n disputes when at work (Frank 1997 (Frank , p. 1833 .
The link between gener~l happiness and a cooperative society provides the basis for asserting that happiness might, in fact. cause growth3. Smith suggests this: that man has a real love of virtue and refinement of manners is a necessary requisite of national opulence, he argues (Stabile 1996. p. 688) . The role of trust in promoting economic growth has recently been emphasized by Fukuyama: 'trust can dra~notically reduce ... transact!on costs ... kind mike possible certlin forms of economic or~anization that otherwise would be encumbered by extensive rules, 'ontracts. litigation and bureaucracy', he argues (Fukuyama 1995. p. 90) . Granato. Inglehart and Lehlang's (1996) cross-country study finds some evidence of a positive correlation of a score of 'trust in people' with economic growth (although. admittedly, a negative association between 'life satisfaction' and growth). Tn linked work, Narayan and Pritchett (1996) expand on Putnam's (1993) study. and find that a measure of 'social capital' (membership of community groups) is strongly and significantly related with average village income in Tanzania. They postulate this might be because of increased informational efficiencies4. As to linked work on inequality, studies tend to find a weakly significant positive link between equity and growth (,Clarke 1995. Bourguignon 1996 , Perotti 1995 . One strand of the literature argues that equality increases trust, social and political stability, so promoting growth (Fay 1993 . Svensson 1994 , Seabright 1997 ? -although most commentators posit other channels6.
Nobody would argue that increased absolute income is the unique cause of increased happiness. What the above discussion suggests is that. while there 2. Arguing tllnl ;I strorig, open hociety with a common moral code is good I'or lhnppiness and good Ihr growth is not the same :IS arguing that 'all community is good'. While a sense of co~ntnuni-ty m~ght he important for every ind~v~dual's happiness. the nature of that community tnight create positive or negalive ex~ernulities I'o~.olhers' happiness and nalional growth. Corntnunities are cxclusive. It is easy ro think of co~nmunities that had have been cxclusive in ways (hat have ~nade others mi.\ernble ((lie MI-ikor~er volh or Hulua. I'or exaniple~. There is :llho evidence that \ L I C~ exclusive cotn~nunities ;ire deterrents lo econotnic :row111 brcciuse !hey increase the complexiry oi public good supply (Easterly I99hi. -I. Althou~h ~t sliould be noted thal another alternpr lo co~.~.elate '\oc~al capital' o f the t'utnam type with growth protluccd a negative association (Helliwell 1996) . \v111le Jackman and Miller ( 1996) rc-cxii~nined Putnaln.5 measures ot civic cotn~nunity .lnd lbu11d them weah predictors of cconomic ~~e r f o r~i i a n c~. 5. Even il'one accepts the Chicago School's ;ir:ument tliar rclntlve income ineqi~cllity represcnls solely clif<crcnccs In rel:ltivc desires Ihr income ;~nd Ieih111.e. one COLII~I ~~~l ; i g i~l e 111: 1t societies w1tl1 huch verv cliAi.l.rnt 'v:ilue5' (;I ~nnr~ilksleii In high Gin1 coell'icie~itl would have lower level!, of truht. 6. 1Iusenben.y (1940) nrgi~ril that inequ;~lit) led the poor to he ~presrurcd into meetlnz corn~nun~ty consu~iiption standal-ds by reduc~ns 11le1r \uvlngs. other-5 point to it5 1.o1e In decreasing cducalional ;irtainmcnt (Atkinson 1997) .
will be many factors determining 'national happiness' (perhaps including crime, war or weather for example), average national income will be an insignificant cause in rich countries while relative incoine might remain significant. On the other hand. the importance of trust and equality to economic growth and the possible link between a happy society and a trusting, cohesive society suggests that there might also be a relationship that runs from happiness to greater national wealth.
Ill. CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE
'Happiness' as meas~ired in polls is designed to capture the degree to which an individual judges the overall quality of his life as a whole favorably (Veenhoven 1993, p. 28) . The question read out for a 'three-step' poll, for example, tends to take the form 'In general, how happy would you say you are'?: very happy, fairly happy or not very happy'?' (Veenhoven 1995) . There are obvious questions over the validity and comparability of such polls. but they do appear to capture feelings of 'the good life', 'satisfaction' and 'pleasure', which ought to increase in growing economies if there is utility in increasing absolute income. Results of these polls do not appear to be random -indeed they are fairly (though not completely) constant over time. The polls also appear to fit with many of our priors. Those who say they are happy tend to appear that way to friends, family members and psychologist interviewers, and they smile more often than those who say they are unhappy. The happy have higher self-esteem and feel in control of their lives. The very rich in the US are slightly happier than average, while hospitalized alcoholics. new inmates, new psychotherapy clients, South African blacks during apartheid and students living under economic and political oppression are all reported as being less happy than average (Myers and Diener 1996, pp. 70-71) . Happiness polls have already been used by a few economists before now (Blanchflower and Oswald 1992) . Further, at least such polls are an attempt to ineasure levels of utility directly, rather than relying on an int tested theory that GNP per capita is a good proxy for societal utility. A clear problem remains that of cultural variations in propensities to see the world in a positive or negative light. or to understand the poll question in different ways (Easterlin 1995. p. 43) '. The figures on means and standard deviations of reported happiness scores over time in a group of western countries (TuDle I) 7. Veenhoven I 1993) argues that linguistic problelns or culture do not play a large role in deter~nining happ~ness scores (pointing to Lhe large difference in happiness scores between the f'urrner Els~ and West Cermanies as an example I, but it is impossible to complelely discount therr role.
suggests this might be u problem with cross-country studies. The average standard deviation of happiness over time within a country is about 0.1 on a threepoint scale (with 'very happy' scoring 3, 'fairly happy' scoring 2 and 'not very happy' scoring I ). The standard deviation of the average happiness across countries is 0.19 -significantly larger. This suggests there is a large constant component (possibly cultural) in people's answers to such polls. This is why, wherever possible, I will lilliit LIIY use of iiappiness polls io in-countiy temporal comparisons rather than cross-country analysiss. 8. 1 will also avoid comparing three-step polls on happiness with four or tivc-step polls. which requ~res an arbitrary (if carefill. and apparently cluite accuratz) ranking of different poll responses on a common ten-pint scale. Despite this. even within polls I am IzR assumlng a spurious cnrdinality. To check the scale of this problem. I took the happiness scores reported in Elbit. 4 and returned to the original polls (reported in Veenhoven 1994) to check the percentages giv~ng each answer. In every cnsc the perccntagc answering that they were not happy increased when the happiness score declined and decreased when the happiness score rose. In all cases but one I France). (he percentage answering they were vely happy decreased when the happiness score declined and increased when the happ~ness score rose. This suggests that the problem is not particularly large. Further, there is plentiful evidence that, at least in the now richer countries, there is no relationship between income growth and growth in reported happiness. In Japan. reported happiness remained at almost exactly the same level between 1958 and 1988 (Veenhoven 1994) . Over that period, Japanese GDP per capita in constant dollars climbed from $3.436 (or about the same as Swaziland's present income per head) to $1 3.156 (Summers and Heston 199 1). Easterlin ( I 995) provides further evidence on the US. Japan and Europe, again suggesting that there is no clear relationship between growth and happiness in these countries. 
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Column I : Happ~ness against a constant and income per capita: Column 2: Happiness grow~h ogninsr a constant and income growth per capita: Column 3: Happiness a~ainst a constant and previous income growth per capita: (Separate regressions ror each country).
Significant at 10%;
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Si_rn~ficant at 5%:
:":';;" Significant 21 I 'fi. Source: Veenhoven ( 1995) ancl Summers and Heston I I991 1. Includes all countries with ten or more beparate years of data on tiational happiness (by ;-step poll) and income.
Looking at reported happiness in the US over time. we have 3-step happiness data from 1952 to 1989. Over that time, US GDP per capita approximately dou-.
bled, from $9.074 to $18.095. As Figure 3 displays, happiness actually dropped over that time by about 0.2 points on a three-point scale (although Oswald 1997, using different data. argues that there is a slight time trend tow~zrd happiness in the US). Taking all the countries from Veenhoven (1993) which have results from ten or more three-step happiness polls and income data in the Penn World Tnb1e.v. I ran separate regressions for each country of happiness against a constant and income, happiness growth against a constant and income growth and happiness against a constant and previous income growthH. The results are reported in E~ble 2. Happiness is significantly and negatively related to income in three countries, while only positively related in one. Lagged income growth is positively and significantly related to happiness in two countries and negatively and significantly related in two countries. Varying the statistical technique, I ran a pooled regression with fixed effects (a separate constant for each country) and with a common constant (Table 3 ). In the fixed effects I-egression, happiness was significantly ~reg~rtively related to income. and happiness zrowth was significantly and negatively related to income growth. There was no relationship between happiness and past income growth in the fixed effects regression and a negative relation in the common constant regression. It is possible that there remains a positive utility to absolute income that happens to have been balanced by equal or larger associated negative externalities such as pollution or the process of social modernization. Still, this evidence suggests at least that the utility gained by income in the West is small compared to other determinants of national happiness.
The cross-country data does suggest some link between income and happiness at least between poorer and richer countries. Such a relationship makes sense in the framework laid out earlier. Clearly, there is a basic level income that is necessary to meet basic animal needs of su~liival. How large a GNP per capita is enough to ensure such basic needs? Diener and Diener (1995) construct a basic needs fultillment index based on access to safe drinking water, infant mortality, life expectancy. percent with sanitary facilities and mean daily calorie supply. It is signiticantly related to income up to a GDP per capita of approximately $4.000, but even this rather advanced list of basic needs then loses any significant correlation with income. Ingmm (1992) comes to similar conclu-1 1 . Because polling took place at irregular intervals and I iiid not want to use overlapping growth rlarr~. 'prcv~ous growth' is the growth that occurred between the last poll and the poll under invesr~garion -1.e.. it is nor a constant-length prnod. This I > only a henous problem if one Imaglnes thers I S a 'Iiappi~iess b~~sinehs cycle'.
sions, while Easterly (1997) argues that the record of the last thirty years suggests an even weaker relationship than Diener and Diener find. Using an analysis that accounts for country fixed effects, Easterly finds that only 7 out of 50 'quality of life' variables that he tests experience causal growth effects that are positive, significant and more important than exogenous shifts (although he notes that this might be because of long and variable lags between income increases and improvements in quality of life indicators)". Includes all countries with ten or more years of d:ita on national happiness (hy thrce step poll) and inco~ne.
17. The .seven are child l.lbor ~ates, calul-i~. inrahc. protein inrake. urs. commercial vehicles, telephones 2nd [hc share of rhe bolro~n income quinrile.
Further. even in poor countries there is evidence to suggest that happiness is related to many other things apart from income and its effects on the standard of living. 4 s we have seen, there is no cross-country correlation between income and happiness in a I990 sub-sample of countries with incomes under $8.000 (although this comes with the usual caveats about cross-country studies, and is based on a very small sample). One thing that might explain this is that people in poorer countries often llave different. more achievable wants. For iinstance, Cantril's cross-country study of The Pc~tterr? o f ' H~~n~a n Concerns (1 965, p. 164) noted that good health is a very low aspiration in India. despite it being the country in his study with by far the worst health record. Cantril also found no clear relationship between concern for personal or national economic affairs and an objective index of socioeconomic status, and an anecdotal definition of what was required for a decent standard of living that was highly correlated with national income (Cantril 1965 . pp. 20 1 and 223): Further. there is clearly great importance attached to issues of non-wealth status and caste in India, even at the cost of absolute wealth gains (Basu 1989. p. 668 ). This, again, is an idea that Adam Smith noted about ~r i t a i n in the mid-eighteenth Century:
'Honor ~nakcs u Srcat part of the reward of all honorable professions. In point of pecuniary gain.
.ill things considered. they are generally ~~ndercompensated' (Smith 1910 , Book I Cli. XI.
It continues to be a factor in modern-day Britain, where rnillions of legitimate welfare claimants do not make claims, apparently in part because of the stigma attached (Sen 1995, p. 14) .
As Aristotle and Smith also noted, and has Long been recognized by proponents of the relative income hypothesis, relative wealth does appear to be a signiticant determinant of happiness. Scitovsky, for example, presents a US poll from 1974 which reports the percentage of people with an income of under S 1.000 answering that they were very happy was 20 percent. This compares to 53 percent answering they were very happy amongst those with an income over $15.000 (Scitovsky 1992, p. 136) . This suggests that the marginal utility of ,.elatitv income remains above zero. In turn. this suggests that laking ten dollius from the rich and giving it to the poor might allow for more people to preserve public decency, at little loss of happiness to the wealthy (especially given how much an individual considers to be a 'good' or 'b:~d' income is strongly dependent on their own wealth (Van Praag 1993. that, even after controlling for a range of other possible correlates, the settlement with equal income distribution was significantly happier than the community where incomes varied (although Tomes 1985 found mixed evidence from a study of income distribution and happiness in Canada). k h l e 4 Income. Inequality, and Happiness Using inequality data From the Deininger-Squire data set, Table 4 provides evidence For such a link from the study countries (excluding Luxembourg, for which there was insufficient inequality data). Taking the earliest and latest year for which the data sets provide Gini and happiness scores, a rising Gini coefficient (showing increased inequality) sees falling happiness in three countries and rising happiness in two. A falling Gini coefficient sees rising happiness in three countries and deciining happiness in one. in other words, six countries confirm a negative relationship between inequality and happiness, and three contradict it. Two of the three that contradict the relationship have the two smallest changes in Gini coefficients in the sample.
This evidence does not allow for us to determine between the modern arguments for the relative income hypothesis and the 'traditional' arguments involving social interaction presented by Smith and Mill. Some evidence for the traditional argument relating happiness and morality does appear when we ask, does hedonic happiness lead to growth? The evidence is, admittedly, weak. In a seventeen-country regression of income growth 1981-90 against a constant and initial income and happiness based on data from Veenhoven, initial happiness was significantly (at 5 percent) negcztil~rly related to growth. On the other hand. Table 3 reports a fixed effects pooled regression of income growth against initial happiness, free from cultural biases, which suggests there is a positive relationship, significant at about 10 percent. Certainly, if there is any causal relationship in rich countries, it appears to run from happiness to growth, not vice-versa.
IV. WHY GROW?
If there is indeed no relationship between happiness and growth, this leads to the question, why grow? Clearly. growth remains important amongst the poorest countries. Growth at this level is vital to create the animal conditions of survival necessary to pursue happiness. How much is enough? The break in the 1990 poll data suggests that there is no relationship between income and happiness after approximately $8.000 per capita. Murray ( 1 988. p. 65) suggests that the link between happiness and wealth has broken down by the time a GNP per capita of about $5.000 (in 1978 US dollars) has been reached (approximately the same level as the breakdown of the link between Diener and Diener's basic needs fulfillment index and GDP per capita). Japan has not grown happier since its income per head was $2.436. while the 1975 poll data reported earlier suggests no significant relationship above $1.000 per capita. Even if we take the upper bound of $8.000, this still suggests that at least OECD governments should turn their attentions from growth to other things1'. As Galbraith (1984) put it, 'to furn~sh a barren room is one thing. To continue to crowd In furniture until the foundation buckles is quite another'.
What other things these are depend on the ways we can still add to the sum of the utilities of all. One way to achieve this might be to alter relative wealth. One of the problems mentioned with GNP per capita at the outset is that the margina1 utility of a dollar might be higher to those at the bottom of the Gini curve than it is to those at the top. Further, we have seen more support for a relationship between happiness and equality, and this suggests a possible role for taxing the luxuries of the wealthy so that 'the indolence and vanity ot'the rich is lnade to contribute in a very easy manner to the relief o f the poor' (Smith 1 9 1 0 )~~.
The continuing importance of relative wealth in determining happiness suggests the presence of a tragedy ofthe commons. In a growing economy. a benevolent state should penalize those activities that increase absolute personal wealth at the cost of general happiness-For exarnple, we have (weak) evidence that leisure and happiness are Slated, based on calculations from the 1990 World Values Survey data reported in Veenhoven ( 1 993) and hours worked per employee data from Maddison (1995) . Those four countries with data that had av-erage work hours per employee of under 1.500 hours a year were five percent happier than those six countries with average work hours over 1.600 a year. Yet, while leisure time has expanded in richer countries, if productivity had continued to rise while incomes per person had remained steady, leisure could have increased far faster. This suggests there might be a role for government in forcing people to take holidays. Left up to themselves, people will continue the struggle to ensure stabie or increasing reiative weaith, abandoning leisure in the pursuit of the Jonses. Unless we force both the Jonses and their neighbors to take holidays, they will both expend valuable leisure time in ensuring that their absolute wealth keeps up.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has not argued that economic growth in developed countries is inherently bad -although there are obvious environmental concerns over its longterm sustainability, and there do appear to be negative externalities attached. Instead, it has argued that there is no particular reason to think that growth is a l w~~~l s good. Growth in wealthy countries fails to create what it is supposed to create: greater utility ''.
I have argued that this is because of a fundamental and widespread misconception of the major causes of happiness. To the extent that there is a link between income and happiness in rich countries, it is connected to relative. not absolute wealth. This has important theoretical implications. For example. if relative wealth is more important than absolute wealth. activities that are detrimental to the national incoine but neutral (or less harmful) to a particular individual become 'rational' I'or that individual. A positive implication is that. if utility is to be gained from honor, badly paid civil servants do not have to be motivated p~~r e l y by opportunities for rent-seeking. Of course, the weak relationship between absolute wealth and utility also has important policy implications. A US worker opposed to NAFTA because it is increasing relative incoine disparities even as it increases output might hold the correct view from a utility-inaxinizn standpoint. Governments that enforce 16 . This does ruse [he qucsllon: why is it \uch a widely held view [hat growth will raise utility? A neo-blarxist might a g u e that it ia because a concen~r;l[ion on econo~nic :rrowtIl leaves questions itbou~ cconolnlc dihtribu~ion unasked. X Weberian l n i~h t point ro [lit. Plu~est:lnt ethic. or \,aria-[loris thereupon. The 1Veberi:ln idea i,ia concern 10 sl~ow one is saved I'ih well w~th a globalized Ic~gedy o f~l i c commons. 12apid economlc growth is the hlgn of a chosen peoplc a i d thaL a cuuni\ r~cli shows i~s cltirens are savcd. LVe grow. [lien. lor tear of damnation. with ;ill lie ;l~tnched ~niacry [hat ~L I C~ ;I world\ iew Ilolda.
maximum working hours provisions might, again, be increasing utility. Even for poorer countries where there almost certainly remains a causal relationship from growth to happiness, the evidence presented here has implications. There is some evidence to suggest that a country that fosters happiness and stronger societies directly, through respect for basic human rights (found a significant determinant of happiness by Veenhoven 1994> p. 136), or attempts to limit inequality, might grow faster. Certainly, there is littie evidence that they grow more slowly". Whatever the nature of causality between happiness and a stronger, inclusive, society, and the exploration above suggests it might be bi-directional, actions that improve happiness and the strength of social interaction are good in their own right and might have the added advantage of encouraging growth. There is no logic to putting off these policy changes until the nation can 'afford' them.
Overall. the analysis in this paper suggests that the answer to the question 'which causes which?' is that both might have a marginal impact on the other. A certain level of economic well-being is a necessary condition for happiness, but there is plentiful evidence to suggest that economic well-being is far from sufficient. Once a certain standard of living is attained, the relationship between growth and happiness breaks down. On the other hand, happiness appears to be far Inore complex than is often assumed when we talk about utility. Being fulfilled involves relations with a wider society that suggest there might be a causal relationship from happiness to growth. This is unimportant in wealthy countries, where the end of happiness has long since separated from the means of economic growth. In poorer countries, however, it suggests that there is no fiecessary conflict between increasing present utility and looking forward to even greater utility in the future.
17. r l l t h o~~g h ~t sllould he noted tliat tlle evidence on n positil'e relation between c~v i l rights and growth is we:lher thsn has becc)nie fashionable to assume. BI-unetti's 11997) aurvry I'il~ds that c~nly Ibur of \even paper\ Iuoking .~t polilical violence lind a significant relat~onsliip wirh growth. 'Tile evidence (111 inequality and s~-owth tilso remains Ilolly clebnted tDeininper and Stluilr 140(1).
